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The world is more than a stage: foreign policy,
development and spatial performativity in Ethiopia
John H. S. Aberg

a

and Derick Beckerb

ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to reconcile performative theorizing, which captures the place of systems of thought on
foreign policy practice, and broader sociological approaches that link networks and institutions across
space, especially as they relate to the global economy. Once developed, the theory, which is termed here
‘spatial performativity’, is applied to recent efforts to promote industrialization through the development
of special economic zones in Ethiopia. In doing so, attention is drawn to a burgeoning area of African and
Chinese foreign policy and economic cooperation.
KEYWORDS
performativity; state space; New Structural Economics; global value chains; China–Africa; industrialization;
foreign policy; special economic zones
HISTORY Received 20 April 2018; in revised form 22 September 2019

INTRODUCTION
Ethiopia is Africa’s fastest growing economy and is attracting the interest of scholars, investors and
leaders alike. The Ethiopian government has launched an ambitious industrialization programme
that is a central part of its Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I and II) initiated in 2010
with the aim of transforming Ethiopia to a middle-income country by 2025. To this end, the
government envisions the establishment of approximately twenty special economic zones
(SEZs) or industrial parks, both state and privately owned, that will attract investment and set
the foundation for the development of the country’s manufacturing base (EIC, 2018). Albeit
from a low level, since 2010, the inﬂow of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been increasing
rapidly and Ethiopia is now the largest FDI recipient in East Africa (UNCTAD, 2017, p.
223). The question that animates this study is less the causes of Ethiopia’s economic growth,
but how to understand the change in development policies that has occurred.
Ethiopia’s development policy reﬂects the agency of a political elite that seeks to maximize
economic growth and development while bolstering the regime (Gadzala, 2015; Gebresenbet,
2014; Hodzi, 2018). Yet, it is also shaped by material changes in the global economy and the
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foreign policies of other states. China, in particular, reﬂects both of these latter points; it has
become a formidable economic power while its foreign policy seeks to promote the outward
expansion of its companies as it climbs global value chains (GVCs). It further relates to institutional and ideational factors as Ethiopia stands out for its unique position in the global developmental ﬁnancial–intellectual nexus, which is palpable in its relation with China, which has
emerged as a key actor in international development, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Apart
from commanding national development banks, Chinese ‘ﬁnancial diplomats’ operate central positions within the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations.
Ethiopia’s development policies have largely been crafted in line with a new body of thought
disseminated from the World Bank called New Structural Economics (NSE) (Lin, 2011a, 2012a,
2012b). Ethiopia serves as a testing ground for the intellectual ideas of its former chief economist,
Justin Lin, who developed NSE and has taken an active interest in the country’s development.
Much of this engagement focuses on policy advice that emphasizes infrastructure investments
and the construction of SEZs to attract foreign light manufacturing ﬁrms, which should spur
Ethiopia’s industrialization process. More than just providing loans, the World Bank plays an
intellectual role that connects economic thinking to pragmatic foreign policy issues (Samoff,
1992; see also Mohan, 1994), with the NSE framing here not only the nature of Ethiopia’s
under/development but also its solutions. At the same time, Chinese manufacturing interests
and Ethiopia’s value to them further reﬂect broad changes in the global economy and China’s
upward GVC mobility (Gerefﬁ, 2014; Zhu & Pickles, 2014).
Hence, Ethiopia’s development policy is a socio-material process that involves ideas, knowledge, institutions and structural factors, yet this process needs to be performed or, rather, put
into practice by actors. Ideas alone provide symbolic power, but agents need to apply ideas to
rearrange or organize the material and social world. Given the prominent role of the World
Bank as a provider of intellectual policy guidance, and given the increasing attention by scholars
to systems of thought in behaviour, we ﬁnd merit (and limits) in performative approaches. Michel
Callon’s notion of performativity and the related concept of agencement is instructive here,
especially how it conceptually seeks to link knowledge/expertise and the material organization
to which it refers (i.e., markets) ‘as a process whereby sociotechnical arrangements are enacted’
(Callon, 2007, p. 330). This notion ﬁts well with Lefebvre’s (1991) spatial theory and the argument that space is produced as a material, mental and social process. The relationship between
material space – the space of the material organization and practices of the global economy –
and the ideational that explicates space by providing a perspective on how to understand the
world, and how to make a way forward within it, is of particular relevance.
Although mobile factors of production, global ﬁnancial centres, GVCs and integrated world
society networks all erode the formerly close-ﬁtting connection between territory, wealth and
power (Agnew, 1994; Babones & Aberg, 2019), we cannot escape the basic spatial fact that
goods still need to be produced somewhere, in some location, and that economic activities
must be performed by someone. Spatial theorizing, as such, employs a range of analytical tools
that function across many levels of analysis akin to macro- and micro-territorial strategies and tactics (Karrholm, 2007, p. 441). Spatial theorizing is explicitly trans-level, recognizing diverse social
domains as relatively autonomous but inherently integrated. As such, the framework we propose
can and should be applied across a range of levels, but any one research project will, by necessity, be
narrower in scope (Leander, 2009). This is particularly relevant for our project where issues of ethnicity and class have a bearing on domestic-level processes relevant to Ethiopia’s economic development and questions concerning who produces and where. Our scope, however, is more macro
and systemic: we wish to focus on state-level processes and actors while also assessing the place of
larger systemic changes in the global economy, particularly those that stem from China’s ongoing
engagement with Africa.
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The paper is structured as follows. It starts the development of spatial performativity and makes
a ﬁrst test of its theoretical relevance by applying it to make sense of Ethiopia’s development policy. We recognize that the theory is still very much under development, but it nonetheless provides
a ﬁrst cut to make good sense of Ethiopia’s development policy – its industrialization programme
and the establishment of SEZs to attract FDIs in light manufacturing.

PERFORMATIVITY AND SPACE: TOWARD A SPATIAL PERFORMATIVITY
Scholars of performativity in international relations, such as Weber (1998) and Campbell
(1992), seek to explicate a state’s foreign policies as acts of ‘performance’ of ideas, norms
and systems of knowledge. In doing so, they wish to show how identity and even sovereignty
itself are not static or uniform but must in fact be enacted or ‘performed’ by actors. Sovereignty,
for example, is not simply a taken-for-granted principle universally applied, but is rather performed in varying contexts by various actors; it is subject to change and development. Yet,
such ‘performances’ rely heavily on discourse and symbolic power for analytical rigour; they
are too far removed from the real practices of states and those who act in their name.
Hence, we are inclined to agree with the critics of this performativity approach (Laffey,
2000; see also Ringmar 2016) who rightly note the signiﬁcant downplaying of social processes
and the basic materiality of the world – or what Henri Lefebvre would criticize as a ‘priority of
language over space’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 36).
The critical political economy literature and the ‘sociological turn’ in International Political
Economy (IPE) has, broadly speaking, demonstrated the value of incorporating ideas, norms,
and systems of knowledge (i.e., symbolic power) as valuable explanatory tools (Blyth, 2002,
2013; MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu Lucia, 2008). Yet, this work similarly tends to downplay
the material, the social networks, and the institutional processes that provide the mechanisms
for ideational diffusion and change (Babones & Aberg 2019; Bieler & Morton, 2008; Carroll
& Carson, 2003; van Apeldoorn & de Graaff 2014). Even a modest prioritization of the mental
space over the physical misses the inherently phenomenological interaction between representations of space, physical space and social space in the production of the world. This is particularly
important for our case as the global economy is not alone causal; rather, such material processes are
‘read’ and understood by actors who, rather than simply ‘perform’ their instantiation, are maintained or reorganized in practice. China’s outward orientation in economic foreign policy and
the World Bank’s intellectual role in making sense of the global economy for developing states
must be understood as bound with the material world they seek to redeﬁne and explain for policy-makers. The effect is to delimit the realms of the possible, the ideal and the unrealistic for
actors, networks and the processes that sustain them. However, we should not do so by prioritizing
or ignoring the material and social nature of the world. Performativity has a certain analytical utility, no doubt. But we ﬁnd greater utility in spatial theories of practice that explicitly link the social,
material and ideational in a single theory of the production of space. Spatial theorizing explicitly
recognizes that actors very much live in a world of their own making that represents its brute materiality as well as the place of knowledge in ‘representing’ that world in a way that allows it to be
transformed or maintained by actors’ ‘spatial practices’ or, what we have chosen to term – in
order to seek unity – spatial performativity.
Lefebvre (1979) has declared that the era of capitalism in which we ﬁnd ourselves is deﬁned by
an ‘explosion of spaces’. As we look across the map of Ethiopia, we are reminded of this simple
truism. Gambella province in the west of the country is all but privatized now, and its populations
of Anuak people have been removed from the land to make space for commercial farming and
growth, as they are corralled into new villages for their own paths to progress (Human Rights
Watch, 2012). In like manner, SEZs emerge and spiral outward from the capital, Addis
Ababa, with the hope that light manufacturing will provide the impetus for national economic
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development. However, in Lefebvre’s thinking, such spaces – or the space of the state itself – is far
more than the terrain upon which we act; it is, as many constructivists will recognize, both the
product and the producer of social processes. Space is where we exist, but it is also how we
exist, in part, by delineating space as either public or private, for example, for cooking and for
sleeping, for manufacturing, for learning, for memorializing, for playing, etc. Space reﬂects
both our utilitarian engagement and ideas of it.
Lefebvre (1991, p. 11) sought to unify what he saw as an unnecessary delineation of space into
discrete domains of enquiry; he sought a uniﬁed theory of the material, the mental and the social.
He was also prescient in his thinking on the state, for he clearly recognized that the state, as part of
a national–territorial space, is increasingly becoming part of a global space – one that speciﬁcally
invokes the role of the global economic system in its transformation (Brenner & Elden, 2009).
This transformation is both systemic and very much micro; it is symbolic – reﬂecting our ideas
on the ideals of trade and economic development – but such abstract symbols inherent in a discourse or theory of development must be enacted in practice, in changed laws, ﬂows of capital
and movements of people as labour.
Mohan and Power’s (2008) recent and wide-ranging analysis of China’s re-engagement with
Africa, though distinct from our approach here, similarly advocated for placing the policy process
in its proper socio-material context; economic processes, party politics and civil society forces in
Africa and China are deftly linked to explain recent developments in China–Africa foreign policies. Such holistic approaches to African politics, though decidedly outside of orthodox political
science, are not entirely new. Indeed, Bayart’s (2009) study of the African state is explicitly social,
material, global and local, as is Chalﬁn’s (2010) study of the way the global economic institutions
shape the development of policies and practices in a globalizing world. Hameiri and Jones (2016,
p. 7) further emphasize that states ‘are institutional ensembles that reﬂect and embed historically
evolving social power relations’, and under globalization they ‘are increasingly fragmented, decentralized and internationalized’. Such approaches are, however, rare and even the recent calls for a
turn to ‘practice’ (Adler & Pouliot, 2011) in the study of foreign policy veer more toward existing
performativity approaches that seem unaware of our material existence as they privilege discursive
performance (for an eloquent critique of the ‘practice turn’, see Ringmar, 2014).
It is here where we see the ﬁrst added utility of our syncretic spatial performativity approach: it
embeds actors and ideas in both local and global material conditions, linkages and processes that
are mutually instantiated as spatially performative acts of practice congruent across levels. The sudden interest in African labour, minerals and land reﬂect actors’ experiences with changes in the
global economy that have made land more valuable, dislocated the location of cheap labour,
and increased the value of existing treaties and trade arrangements that have made investments
in certain African locations more attractive. Equally true, however, is the fact that not all states
are interested; interested parties have their own domestic economic and political reasons for engaging the continent. Each state is caught up in its own web of relationships that inform policy and
decision-making processes.
The second value added of our spatial approach is our incorporation of knowledge as representational space. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in exploring how the economic theory of
NSE represents the space of the economy as a site of both problems and solutions. Like Callon’s (1984) concept of problematization, representational space is where knowledge outlines a
range of actors, resources and technologies required to conceive and remake the space of the
Ethiopian economy. That is, it does so by organizing the problem and solutions into who matters, what matters and who needs to be involved, for example, experts, policy-makers or owners
of capital.
Knowledge must be put into practice in the production of the world that it seeks to explain,
thereby removing it as an independent variable (cf. Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Knowledge
organizes social activity by setting boundaries and possibilities of action, but it does not necessarily

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

The world is more than a stage: foreign policy, development and spatial performativity in Ethiopia

5

set all goals or interests; economies, as social activities – with agents, corporations and infrastructures – produce diverse interests and capabilities that give rise to numerous practical problems that,
in turn, call on the production of more knowledge. The production and use of knowledge is deeply
intertwined with the social behaviour that it, at times, seeks to explain (Mitchell, 2002). The social
and ontological separation of the object and its theoretical representation is set aside in spatial performativity through socio-technical statements of the world that are implicated in enacting the
world. That is, knowledge makes it possible to act by explaining how the world is, why it is
and what to do as a result.
NSE, as knowledge, then represents the economic space of the state as having speciﬁc problems and potential solutions; it provides a logic to policy formation by deﬁning boundaries of
social claims that can be made through, for example, budgets, the privatization of resources,
the prioritization of resources and the ranking of competing claims of individuals and organizations. However, its effects are speciﬁcally spatial and material: it delineates both the material
space of the state and its relations to other spaces within the state and the global economy
while also reorganizing social relations within this space. No one form of knowledge is, however,
so total as to exclude other representational practices, such as gender or ethnicity (Tache & Oba,
2009; Tejani & Milberg, 2016), which can and do retain explanatory power on some levels but not
others.
This point on the trans-level nature of our approach is worth exploring for a moment as it has a
bearing on the boundary and scope conditions of our case. Whatever the utility of such a translevel approach, in practice, any research project will be narrower or broader in scope, encompassing
the local or simply acknowledging it but setting it aside in favour of systemic and macro-analysis.
For example, the theory of NSE places considerable emphasis on infrastructure spending in its
representations of development and the economy. However, to build such infrastructure there
must be the material and intellectual resources at hand along with other interested and capable
agents to provide capital and manpower. In the case of Ethiopia, however, one also ﬁnds that
domestic ethnic representations are present in practice; they affect recruitment of labour and
who must move as space is set aside for privatization, development and the building of infrastructure (Adugna, 2011; Becker & Wittmeyer, 2013; Lavers 2012; Tache & Oba, 2009). Race, gender
and ethnicity will undoubtedly shape local micro- and meso-level labour practices even while systemic processes explain the existence of factories themselves (Ngai, 2004).
There are, as such, multiple representational practices at work in the production of space.
What is important is that our theoretical logic operate similarly regardless of our particular level
or site of analysis. It is precisely because a theory of spatial performativity can incorporate such
local practices within an explanation of the broader transformation of the state and international
systemic processes that we seek to apply it here in our study of NSE and Ethiopia’s development
policy. However, the scope of our project does not presently address the lived experiences at a considerably more micro-level. Rather, we focus on NSE as representational of both the domestic
Ethiopian economy and its place in the global economy. We seek to understand this representational space and how it interprets changes in the material organization of the global economy
while also pushing policy-makers to interpret and reorganize the Ethiopian economy through it.
Our project is very much a product of theorizing, and is as such placed on a foundation of previous scholarly work, relating to the relevant literature of the ﬁeld of study. In order to theorize, as
Swedberg (2014, p. 169) puts it:
You … need to know some social theory and be able to handle it well. You may, for example, need to take a
concept from one theory and combine it with a concept from another theory. You may want to eliminate
some part of a theory and replace it with a new idea of your own, and so on.
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Hence, we review, problematize, and critically evaluate the existing literature in order to draw out
conceptual pieces and put them to work in new ways. More speciﬁcally, we deploy two argument
heuristics: we make an assumption and reconceptualize (Abbott, 2004, pp. 110–136). First, we
introduce the spatial assumption to theories of performativity. Second, we reconceptualize theories
of performativity by emphasizing the trans-level nature of spatiality and how actors and ideas are
embedded in both local and global material conditions, institutions, linkages and processes. We
also incorporate knowledge or systems of thought through the notion of representational space.
Our theoretical perspective proves its utility by being used to construct a case-speciﬁc analytical
narrative. If theories ‘fail to accomplish the pragmatic explanatory goals for which they were
crafted, they can be discarded – not for being false, but for being useless’ (Jackson, 2011, p. 143;
emphasis added). This resonates with Büthe (2002, p. 488) who similarly suggests that the validity
of analytical narratives should not be measured as true or untrue but rather as ‘plausible’ or not.
Moreover:
The empirical application of a model is more about calibrating the model than about falsifying it; the appropriate response to a discrepancy between the model and the data is either to update the model or to adduce
situationally speciﬁc reasons why the observed outcome in that case was not what the model ideal-typically
envisions. (Jackson, 2011, p. 147; emphasis added)

In many ways, our project can be viewed as a response to the discrepancy between mainstream
performative theorizing and how we observe the world, which led us to theorize spatial performativity. And, of course, it is our conviction that spatial performativity is useful and that the case of
Ethiopia’s development policy showcases its utility. The following attempts to demonstrate that so
is the case.

FITTING THE TERRAIN: NSE AND THE REPRESENTATIONAL SPACE OF
ETHIOPIA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Trends in the global economy indicate notable shifts in its processes and modes of integration
associated with the broad processes of globalization. The ‘rising tide’ metaphor of globalization
proponents (similarly invoked by opponents) has characteristically engendered ‘the rise of the
rest’ reply and its related ‘South–South cooperation’. (OECD, 2010; UNCTAD, 2010). Along
with the old narrative of Asian Tigers comes the more recent ‘Africa Rising’ discourse, which
is replacing the previously grim image of the continent with a more optimistic outlook against
the background of several fast-growing economies (The Economist, 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Swaniker, 2013; for a critical perspective, see Taylor, 2016).
Bernaysian sloganeering aside, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
have managed to acquire ‘well-organized domestic supply bases and they have moved up the
value chain to incorporate key input suppliers, as well as pre-production (design, R&D [research
and development] and purchasing) and post-production (logistics, marketing and branding) services’ (Gerefﬁ, 2014, p. 15). This is a process where China stands out, and the ‘steeply rising costs
of land, regulatory compliance, and especially labour (including both wages and beneﬁts) in China’s coastal export manufacturing centres have begun to erode these centres’ cost advantage’
(Dinh, Palmade, Chandra, & Cossar, 2012, p. 4). It was in relation to this dynamic that Lin
famously estimated that up to 85 million jobs would be made available globally in labour-intensive
industries as China moves up the GVC and relocates its light manufacturing to countries with
cheaper production costs (Lin, 2011b). Therefore, the current restructuring of cost advantages
in light manufacturing is said to offer opportunities for African countries to enter the GVC,
increase private investment and create productive jobs (Dinh et al., 2012). The World Bank,
under Lin’s intellectual leadership, actively promoted NSE as the relevant policy framework for
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African countries to seize this opportunity by explicitly invoking China’s development experience,
in particular infrastructure investments and the use of SEZs to attract investments in light manufacturing (Dinh et al., 2012; Lin, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b; Lin & Wang, 2015).
Outside of NSE, Ethiopia and Africa are nestled in a range of institutional arrangements that
facilitate Chinese–African economic ties, especially a conducive institutional landscape consisting
of duty- and quota-free exports enjoyed by African and least developed countries in the American
and European markets through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. Hence, the deepening of Chinese–African ties and South–
South cooperation partly depends on incentives for investment provided by core Western states
and the institutional arrangement they developed and promoted. However, such arrangements
and incentives are closely linked with systems of thought that seek to explicate the world as
much as they guide politicians to implement market friendly policies. In the case of Ethiopia,
NSE ﬁgures as the concrete system of thought promoted as a policy framework designed to
guide Ethiopia’s development process. Apart from capturing the global economic changes associated with China’s rise, NSE provides a distinct ‘problematization’ of space.
What constitutes a ‘problem’ can either stem from the practical experience of living in the
world and/or from systems of thought that help explain the world and what is wrong with it.
What interests us most here is how a system of thought, in this instance NSE, explains the
world, notes a problem with it and elucidates a solution to it. The question that NSE attempts
to answer is fundamental, straightforward and old. It concerns the very nature of the development
problem: How can and do poor countries develop? (Lin, 2012b). In the past, this question resulted
in answers that could be placed on a continuum from the ahistorical to the deeply historical. Modernization theorists stood at one pole and Marxist scholars at the other; one proposed a neutral
view to how all states develop where the other saw one state’s immiseration as inexplicably tied
to the wealth of others; one called for ‘good’ policy, where the other called for structural change
to the global economy. The debate has never truly been settled, but the question has been
posed anew by NSE from within the World Bank.
Like many such holistic theories before it, NSE makes its argument temporal but also uniquely
spatial. At the centre of NSE lies an emphasis on light manufacturing as a starting point for structural transformation and economic development. NSE consists of three core pillars that echo
modernization theory. First, an economy’s factor endowment is endogenously determined and differs depending on the stage of development, which has implications for the optimal industrial
structure at a given point of economic development. Second, stages of economic development
shall be viewed as parts of a gradual process spanning along a continuum from ‘a low income agrarian economy to a high-income post-industrialized economy’, and not described in bifurcated
terms like ‘developing countries’ versus ‘industrialized countries’. Third, while the market is recognized as the ‘basic mechanism for effective resource allocation’, the state is simultaneously imperative, mainly as a facilitator that should play an ‘active role’ in assisting and coordinating industrial
upgrading by providing infrastructure (both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ infrastructure) (Lin, 2012a, pp. 14–
15). The active facilitating role of the state suggested by NSE should not be confused with the ‘big
push’ perspective that advocates a more central and direct role of the state in the resource allocation
and industrialization process. According to Lin, such interventions are comparative advantagedefying and stand in contrast to the comparative advantage-following approach of the NSE (see
the debate in Lin & Chang, 2009). From the perspective of NSE, light manufacturing is the logical ﬁrst step out of a low-income agrarian economy. That this would not happen via an invisible
hand means that speciﬁc policies would need to be enacted to facilitate and bring about this structural transformation.
What stands out here is the transhistorical a priori assumptions of factor endowment. While
there is certainly justiﬁcation in broad statements about the structural differences between highly
industrialized countries in Europe and agricultural economies in Africa, a country’s factor
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endowment is also relational. That is, as Lin’s writings, his case studies and the actions of the Chinese and Ethiopian governments make clear, broader global economic conditions and economic
transformations alter the relevant value of a given state’s factor endowment; it does not exist a
priori. As was noted above, even broader multilateral economic treaties can increase, and thus
potentially decrease, the value of focusing on trade and economic investments in a given state.
The dearth of infrastructure to bring goods to markets can also affect the relative value of endowments. Thus, whatever a priori assumptions are made, they require a host of actions and entanglements to function as understood within NSE. They must be made active in practice via
government action and the formation of investment relationships, which occur in the context
of GVC governance and production network dynamics (Neilson, Pritchard, & Yeung, 2014).
As conceived by Michel Callon, ‘problematization’ does not simply provide an answer to the
development question. It also envisions a particular constellation of actors who deﬁne their identities and interests relative to each other and in a manner that is explicable from within a speciﬁc
body of knowledge (Callon, 1984). According to NSE, the state should focus on removing ‘key
constraints’ (poor trade logistics, infrastructure bottlenecks, lack of skills, etc.) by implementing
‘selective’ development policies that ‘narrow down’ the reform agenda and make it more manageable. The state should provide investments incentives, such as tax exemptions, and in particular, as
inspired by the Chinese development experience, it should focus on critical infrastructure and the
construction of SEZs for light manufacturing (Dinh et al., 2012; Lin, 2012a; Lin & Wang, 2015).
The NSE thus produces a particular image of the state that is clearly outward looking and
export oriented, even as it focuses inwardly on transformation. The focus on the particular factor endowments of a given state still necessitates that states get the policies right; the market
does function according to some logic, but states may misunderstand this logic and craft
poor policies that hinder development. States must then actively focus on the ‘right’ set of policies linked to their particular factor endowment and their speciﬁc infrastructure needs, with an
eye to developing the state for the present and future needs of the global economy. If African
states consider this advice, according to NSE, they will attract FDIs and seize the opportunities
of China’s upward GVC mobility and the ongoing redistribution of cost advantages in light
manufacturing.
However, China complicates the neat theoretical arrangement offered by NSE. Even when
putting aside the strong ties between business and government in China, the push to invest abroad
is as much a domestic concern within China as a useful foreign policy tool. Within the ‘broad strategic contours’ set by the CCP leadership, Chinese foreign policies are increasingly fragmented
with many diverse foreign policy actors involved in their own ‘inter-scalar contestation’ reﬂecting
diverse interests and purposes (Hameiri & Jones 2016, p. 72). The linkages required indeed foster
greater Chinese economic inﬂuence in the region, and more broadly, China’s role in shaping what
South–South cooperation looks like, yet this is done through a diverse range of actors. Chinese
development banks and funds have come to play important roles in providing development capital,
with a strong emphasis on reducing infrastructural bottlenecks (Chen, 2013; Lin & Wang, 2015).
These ﬁnancial entities are working together with the Chinese government and together with traditional multilateral donors as they collaborate with African governments. Yet, there is no self-evident link between Chinese or multilateral development capital and Ethiopia or between Ethiopia
and foreign light manufacturing ﬁrms. There might be strong structural inducements but not
structural inevitability. For economic opportunities to materialize, they have to be performed
and made to do so. The problematization of development within NSE, by identifying and
empowering a set of actors and logics through which the actors should operate, is indispensable
to the various network constellations and relationships set to bring about industrialization in
Ethiopia. Such a system of knowledge must be made to ﬁt local circumstances; it requires an
actor with existing, if at times opposed, interests and distinct social processes.
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Under the long leadership of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) and the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia has been inspired by Chinese
and East Asian development experiences – a legacy that continues to thrive under current
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The common purpose that unites the Ethiopian political elite is
a strong sense of national mission, a sense of urgency to develop the country and erase the ‘national
shame’ of poverty (Cheru, 2016). In fact, development is securitized, and the developmental discourse of the Ethiopian government frames poverty as an existential threat (Gebresenbet, 2014).
At the core, we ﬁnd the conviction that the country must embark on a new path towards industrialization to realize the telos of national development, especially one that moves toward attracting
FDI (see the interview with former Ethiopian President Mulatu Teshome in Abiye & Fikade,
2013).
This has given rise to a push to orient better the Ethiopian state within the global economy in
line with the representational space conceived by NSE and by learning from the Chinese and the
wider East Asian development experience. In 2010, Ethiopia launched its ﬁrst Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP I), and, in 2015, the second plan (GTP II) was set in motion. Ethiopia aims to become a low middle-income country by 2025, and the government envisions the
establishment of approximately twenty SEZs throughout the country, both state and privately
owned (EIC, 2018). As is stated in the main text of the GTP II, industrial parks are ‘necessary’
to reach ‘Ethiopia’s goal of becoming Africa’s light manufacturing hub’ (Ethiopian National Planning Commission, 2016, p. 143). With a population exceeding 100 million, Ethiopia is the
second-most populous country in Africa, and apart from having a population with extremely
low salary levels, Ethiopia stands out for its comparative advantage in ﬁve particular light-manufacturing sectors: leather, apparel, wood, metal and agribusiness (Dinh et al., 2012).
Without a test ground that ﬁgures as the spatial laboratory for NSE the promise of light manufacturing to kick start growth and development that the theory envisions would never materialize.
This, in fact, invests the Ethiopian elite with agency (as much as it sparks internal political
struggles for control over the economic processes). Although other African states are ready to
cut the links that tie Ethiopia to a burgeoning network of stakeholders and replace it as the
next example that ﬁlls the ‘Africa Rising’ discourse with substance, the competitive dynamic
does not prevent certain policy ownership and agency. The ﬁt between particular constellations
of actors and processes is manifest in the spatial practices of these actors in commanding material
changes to the Ethiopian economy and in policy changes to produce an investment climate as
envisioned in NSE. Thus, through the performative lens, NSE’s problematization of economic
development makes it possible to conceive of new networks of actors that can and eventually
do come together to engender material changes in the economy and the physical space of the state.

SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM
REPRESENTATION TO TRANSFORMATION
The high-level Chinese support for investment promotion through the establishment of SEZs
across Africa has been reiterated at the Ministerial Conferences of the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) since its creation in 2000. At the third FOCAC Ministerial Conference
in 2006, former Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that China would establish between three
and ﬁve SEZs in Africa, out of which one, the privately run Eastern Industrial Zone, was established in Ethiopia in 2007. The establishment of the government-run Bole Lemi Industrial Zone
followed in 2012, co-ﬁnanced by the World Bank (UNDP, 2015). In 2016, the Hawassa industrial park was inaugurated, and in 2017, the Kombolcha and Mekelle industrial parks were inaugurated while another six SEZs are under construction. The China Civil Engineering
Construction Corporation (CCECC) serves as the main contractor for the construction of the
industrial parks (EIC, 2018). So far, textile, garment and shoe manufacturers from China, Turkey
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and several other countries have established production in Ethiopian SEZs. Retail chains such as
Tesco, Walmart and H&M have begun sourcing their goods from Ethiopia. Much like an earlier
era of unspooling production into piecemeal webs across oceans, the current economic processes
rest on the active concatenation of interests and ideas.
Who speaks and from where one speaks is as important as what is spoken. To recognize fully the
importance of this seemingly obvious point, however, requires recognizing that social processes
exist within material ones. While social networks and processes matter, they alone cannot tell
us much unless we link such processes to both institutions of authority and material resources.
NSE, as a system of knowledge, further harmonizes actors and interests that control powerful
assets, offer institutional economic legitimacy, and decision-making control. The close association
of key institutions in the global economy, the Word Bank, the Chinese government and the
Ethiopian government is thus not a priori but must be made and produced by individuals who
see such an association.
In the prologue of his book The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off
(2012), Lin outlines what it meant to occupy the commanding heights of knowledge production
within the World Bank:
Being asked to serve presented an extraordinary opportunity and was a sign of changing times. For the ﬁrst
time since the World Bank was created in 1944, a national from a developing country was being invited to
serve as its chief economist, guide its intellectual leadership, and shape the economic research agenda of the
institution. To meet the challenges of development, the institution had to be an agent of change. To be effective in this role it must combine its ﬁnance with ideas and knowledge. (Lin, 2012b, p. x, emphasis added)

This power to inﬂuence, guide and shape development ideas and policy was to a signiﬁcant extent
directed toward Africa, and Ethiopia in particular. Together with a growing number of Chinese
ﬁnancial diplomats who operate central positions within the Bretton Woods institutions and the
United Nations, such as Li Yong, Director General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the mission is to ‘bring the manufacturing industry to the African
continent’ (Li, 2014, p. 4). In his keynote presentation at the ﬁrst UNIDO forum on strategies
and instruments for inclusive and sustainable industrial development (ISID) in June 2014, Lin
outlined the Growth Identiﬁcation and Facilitation Framework (GIFF) as an effective methodology for targeting ‘latent comparative advantage based on the endowment structure of the economy and its level of development’. Lin bases GIFF on NSE and its viability is tellingly
demonstrated by the ‘excellent example’ of Ethiopia (UNIDO, 2014, p. 13), which serves as
one of three pilot countries in UNIDO’s Programme for Country Partnership (PCP).
The ﬁrst study Lin commissioned as Chief Economist of the World Bank, Light Manufacturing in Africa (Dinh et al., 2012), was explicitly based on NSE and used Ethiopia as a case study.
Lin, who served as advisor to both Zenawi and Hailemariam, ofﬁcially released the study in Ethiopia and urged that it be used as a ‘guide’ for the transformation of Ethiopia’s industrial structure
(World Bank, 2012). Zenawi later visited factories and industrialists in the Pearl River Delta and
invited Chinese manufacturers to establish production in Ethiopia, couching the appeal for investment around Ethiopia’s relative factor endowment and the potential for light manufacturing, such
as shoe making.
The production of space offers a decidedly non-determinist perspective on network conﬁgurations, one that embraces messy real-world contingency while still taking account of the concrete
materialities that limit and expand the scope of choice. By way of example, Helen Hai – UNIDO
Goodwill Ambassador, chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) of the Made in Africa Initiative, former
Executive Member of Huajian Shoe Company, and advisor to several African leaders – provides
a telling account in an interview with the Ethiopian newspaper, The Reporter:
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One way of attracting investment is by creating quick and successful examples. I think the case of Huajian is
worth mentioning. This happened in just about two years. The reason I am doing what I am doing now is
that I was deeply touched by the willingness of [Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn] and his desire to
attract FDI in order to create more jobs and increase exports. Once, I was travelling with him on a plane
and that gave me an opportunity to understand that he is more than willing to attract foreign investments to
Ethiopia even more than his predecessor. (Fikade, 2014)

The quick and successful example of Huajian Shoe Company to establish production in Ethiopia
that Hai mentions came into being through contingent events that illustrate an important empirical facet – the need for political seduction to ‘lock in’ and convince actors to accept the roles proposed for them (Callon, 1984). Such ‘locking in’, of course, requires the active participation of key
individuals to engender relationships to produce a given end. This is, as such, an active social process of ‘tying practices together’ (Jackson 2004, p. 286), and one of many.
In July 2014, Lin led a group of Chinese industrialists from the Chinese regions of Fuijian and
Zhejiang, as well as from Hong Kong and Taiwan, to examine the business environment and the
possibilities for investment in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Senegal. The nature of the networking that
took place is elucidated in travel chronicles, documented by China’s National School of Development (NSD), Peking University, where Lin is Honorary Dean:
The majority of the Chinese delegation was made up of business leaders from textiles, garments and shoemaking. During the trip, the delegation met with various heads of state, visited special economic zones,
listened to reports on the investment environment … had in-depth discussions on the situation with
local Chinese Embassy Economic Counsellors, negotiated partnership possibilities with international
buyers and witnessed the signing of investment agreements between two of the delegation members and
African governments. (NSD News, 2014)

In Ethiopia, Lin was ofﬁcially honoured for his work and awarded with a commemorative silver
medal by former Prime Minister Hailemariam for his contribution to the Ethiopian economy,
further strengthening their ties and displaying Lin’s indispensability to Ethiopia’s development
programme (NSD News, 2014).
As is becoming clear, whatever the seemingly neutral focus on certain factor endowments
within NSE, such endowments only become productive, even potentially so, when understood
as such and when capable actors can facilitate its productive organization. Neither the World
Bank and investors, nor Chinese and Ethiopia’s politicians are working with a blank slate but
rather with what is ready to hand. In this sense Ethiopia also offers numerous other facilitating
institutions as part of its role as the conference and headquarters capital of Africa. Ethiopia enjoys
political network centrality and the capacity to organize networking opportunities. This provides
greater access to relevant stakeholders and increases opportunities to strengthen the links with a
wide variety of actors. For example, the two-day international forum, Investing in Africa
Forum, which was held in Addis Ababa on 30 June–1 July 2015, is but one of several multi-stakeholder events that gather many inﬂuential entities under the same roof. Representatives from
the World Bank, UNIDO, the Chinese government, Chinese development banks and the Ethiopian government were all assembled in a collaborative effort ‘to promote accelerated and responsible investment and investment partnerships in African countries, both from China and
elsewhere as well as within Africa, particularly for the light manufacturing sector’ (World Bank,
2015).
Such forums, though obvious sites of networking, as one might expect, are gatherings with a
speciﬁc intent organized around a speciﬁc agenda with select individuals in attendance. The forum
is part of the social process whereby roles are enacted and concretized. The current conference also
served a dual purpose of providing some legitimacy to the ideas of NSE and Ethiopia as an
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exemplar. The linkages between NSE, Ethiopia, China, the UN, the World Bank and economic
development were woven into a coherent nexus (see also UNIDO, 2014).
At these forums, Ethiopian state ofﬁcials perform the role of diplomatic campaigning activists
ready to promote their country’s opportunities. For instance, at UNIDO’s second ISID forum in
November 2014, Ethiopian State Minister for Industry Mebrahtu Meles advocated for Ethiopia’s
investment opportunities in the manufacturing sector. Meles outlined Ethiopia’s factor endowment and its priority sectors for investment, which were similar to what was outlined in the
World Bank’s Light Manufacturing in Africa study (Dinh et al., 2012). Meles further highlighted
the role of the Investment Board of Ethiopia’s Investment Commission and the Industrial Zones
Development Corporation, which are speciﬁc bureaucratic agencies that handle investments in
Ethiopia’s SEZs. Apart from investments in soft infrastructure, such as the establishment of vocational training centres and expansion of universities, Meles also emphasized Ethiopia’s ‘massive
investments’ in hard infrastructure, such as investments in energy infrastructure (dam construction) and critical transport infrastructure (highways and railways) crucial for enhancing power
capacity and for linking landlocked Ethiopia to global markets. Meles further offered an impressive set of investment incentives. In sum, his performance demonstrates a government dedicated ‘to
provide hand holding support to the private sector’ for the economic reorganization of the Ethiopian state (Meles, 2014).
For Ethiopian ofﬁcials, SEZs are seen as imperative devices for attracting investment and
binding actors and doing so over the long term (UNIDO, 2014, p. 31). The SEZ serves as a
perfect material and spatial transformation as envisioned within the representational space of
NSE by literally delineating space where speciﬁc economic activities can occur, where infrastructure is organized in favour of these activities, and where resources – material and manpower – are
funnelled to produce an economic outcome. These SEZs are also set apart from the domestic
institutional landscape and function as ‘one-stop shops’ where government services are streamlined and located within the zone (Addis Fortune, 2018). That this occurs under the positive
aegis of a suite of policies and government acts to bring about changes in regulations, tax structures, labour laws, and infrastructure in this speciﬁc place should not detract us from the role
played by NSE nor the real social processes that engendered these SEZs and the economic
activities produced therein.

CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to understand the change in Ethiopia’s development policy, and to
this end we sought to develop a model of spatial performativity. We started with a basic premise:
economic material organization (domestic and global), systems of knowledge, overlapping treaty
structures, and social networks do not stand alone but must be put into practice. Focusing on practices allows researchers to capture not just the ongoing production and reproduction of a given
social system but how and why it changes as it does. Similarly, we sought to explicate these processes as neither strictly local nor systemic. Indeed, Ethiopia’s factor endowment and the varied yet
often overlapping trade treaties obtain their particular value here in conjunction with changes in
the global economy, particularly China’s GVC mobility. But so too is there a role for knowledge in
guiding actors policy choices. Here the intellectual ideas of Lin, who took an active interest in
Ethiopia’s development while serving as Chief Economist of the World Bank, plays a signiﬁcant
role. NSE is representational of both the domestic Ethiopian economy and its place in the global
economy. It provides a speciﬁc interpretation of the changes in the material organization of the
global economy while also pushing policy-makers to interpret and reorganize the economy
through it. As a result, it pushed the Ethiopian state towards infrastructure investments and construction of SEZs for light manufacturing. Through these speciﬁc instances of domestic and
foreign policy development and the crystallization of disparate interests as forms of spatio-
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performativity, Ethiopia has become enmeshed in global production networks and is presently
redrawing the map, so to speak, for capital accumulation and growth. Whether it will succeed
in becoming a middle-income country by 2025 remains to be seen.
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